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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of spillovers in a model of en-
dogenous technical change resulting from learning or network eﬀects
on the existence of a lower bound to market concentration.
1 Introduction
Why are some industries dominated by very few firms (even on a global scale)
while others have only negligible degrees of market concentration? How is
this question related to the size of those markets and how do other industry
1
specifics such as learning and network eﬀect aﬀect market structure?
The study of these issues is imperative for all those involved in competi-
tion policy analysis as well as for decision making bodies that are concerned
with industrial policy in the widest sense. The key statistic in the analysis,
the concentration ratio, plays a dominant role in the legal and economic as-
sessment of merger cases in front of national and super-national bodies. The
n− firm concentration ratio is defined as
Cn =
P
n xiP
N xi
where the xi are outputs of the N firms in the industry and the numerator
sums the n largest of these. The free availability of data on market concen-
tration makes it a potentially fruitful research area for empirical analysis.1
The traditional literature on market structure purports a negative rela-
tionship between market size and seller concentration on the grounds that for
a given level of ’barriers to entry’ an increase in market size should increase
profitability of incumbents and thus lead to new entrants. This usually lowers
the concentration ratio depending on prior skewness of the size distribution
1For some (rather weak) empirical evidence from cross-sectional studies on the market
size-concentration ratio relationship see Schmalensee, 1989.
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and on what share of a growing market the entrants can capture.2
As a reference point for the main analysis we will now briefly discuss what
happens in simple homogeneous good industries as the market grows. Given
that the form of competition will have an eﬀect on the profitability of firms
in the industry it will also determine the entry behaviour of firms and hence
the concentration ratio of the industry.
In detail this implies that given the structure of the game can be mean-
ingfully represented as having separate periods, if firms face a weaker form
of competition in the market period(s), more firms will enter the game in the
entry period given some total market size, as it is easier for them to recoup an
initial sunk entry cost. This last deliberation follows the logic of ’backward
induction’ commonly used in the game theoretic analysis of stage games.
For competition à la Cournot it can be shown (given some mild regularity
conditions) that the equilibrium price strictly decreases in the number of firms
and approaches the competitive level in the limit (Walrasian equilibrium
price) where price distortions will be minimized. This finding is supported
by the intuition that as the number of firms increases, each firm’s output
2One may think of pathological cases in which entry increases the concentration ratio
by the entrant capturing most (or even all) of an increase in market size.
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has a decreasing influence on price and thus firms will act approximately as
’price takers’. Furthermore the equilibrium number of firms that enter the
industry will grow unbounded as market size increases. This implies that in
large markets the concentration ratio declines to zero.
Given that firms compete à la Bertrand in the market period the presence
of completely homogeneous products will lead to what is commonly referred
to as the ’Bertrand paradox’. It implies that the unique Nash equilibrium
of a stage game (in pure strategies) is that firms charge a price equal to
marginal cost which has the drastic implication that for any arbitrary small
sunk entry cost in the first period at most one firm will enter. Thus the
industry will be a monopoly and the concentration ratio equals one for any
market size.
As is commonly accepted, the Bertrand model provides only an extreme
reference for competition since it makes very strong assumptions about the
homogeneity of products, the timing, and the form of strategic interdepen-
dence. For most (non-Bertrand) specifications of the data however we will
find that the concentration ratio will converge to zero as the market grows
large.
The side-by-side of Cournot and Bertrand models and their drastic im-
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plications given positive setup costs indicate the need for a more refined
modelling approach in order to capture equilibrium entry behaviour of firms
and the implied development of the concentration ratio in markets that grows
out of bounds.
1.1 A condition for non-fragmentation
The above case of complete fragmentation in a homogeneous good market
under Cournot competition turns out to be non-robust to additional specifi-
cations of the industry in more complex models. A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for non-fragmentation exists: There may be an upper limit on the
total number of firms that can profitably enter the industry independently of
market size.
In order to investigate such an upper bound on the number of firms,
Sutton (1998) develops a model of vertically diﬀerentiated products with en-
dogenous technical change as present in the case of firm specific learning or
network eﬀects.3 He finds that the degree of fragmentation of an industry
3The origins of this ’bounds approach’ can be traced back much further. See for exam-
ple Shaked & Sutton (1983) who find an upper bound to the number of firms in a vertically
diﬀerentiated industry as the market gets out of bounds depending on the underlying con-
sumer preferences and the income distribution. They assume that consumers’ willingness
to pay for quality improvements is an increasing function of income.
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will be inversely related to the overall strength of these eﬀects. The model
is similar to that of Sutton (1991) ’endogenous sunk cost’ model which deals
with the eﬀects of investments in advertising on market structure. However
the equal treatment of the two issues tends to conceal an important diﬀer-
ence: In the advertising context, spillovers are usually of negligible relevance
as product advertisement may often be well targeted towards a firm’s own
product. This will not always be possible in a learning or network investment
context if firms can free ride on other firms’ product innovations.4
Sutton’s (1998) model abstracts from such complications and predicts
that an upper bound on the equilibrium number of firms always exists for
any arbitrary small learning eﬀect. He calls this a ’Nonconvergence Theorem’
which holds that in the limit the equilibrium concentration ratio will not
converge to zero.
The underlying intuition why learning may support a non-convergence
result in a stage game with diﬀerentiated products and multiple production
stages is as follows: Learning implies a form of dynamic increasing returns to
scale. Firms will ’overproduce’ (above the level that one shot Cournot profit
4With regard to spillovers and market concentration, Fudenberg & Tirole (1983) show
that in a model where learning eﬀects have a direct eﬀect on other firms’ marginal cost,
firms’ equilibrium output can be shown to decrease with the degree of learning spillover.
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maximization would dictate) in order to be able to ’slide down’ the learning
curve. This will imply lower equilibrium profits so that initially fewer firms
will enter. Learning eﬀects can thus be expected to strengthen the lower
bound to concentration by inducing fewer entrants who correctly anticipate
the overproduction escalation.
The model investigated here will also look at endogenous technical change
in a learning context. In contrast to Sutton (1998) however we allow for
spillovers of learning eﬀects. We show that, not only do spillovers reduce the
eﬀect that learning has on equilibrium market structure but they can even
lead to the non-existence of a lower bound to market concentration.
Intuitively this result follows from the fact that the presence of spillovers
introduce additional strategic considerations into firms’ profit maximizing
output decisions. The more learning eﬀects can be used advantageously by
the firms’ competitors relative to the benefits they imply for the firm itself,
the more its incentives to learn are distorted. The overproduction result is
weakened leading to larger equilibrium profits so that initially more firms will
enter pushing downwards the lower bound to concentration in large markets.
Compared to Sutton’s, our model with spillovers predicts that the non-
existence of a lower bound to concentration and hence the failure of his ’Non-
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convergence Theorem’ is much more prevalent given that inter-firm spillover
eﬀects are large relative to intra-firm learning or that the overall learning
eﬀect is small.
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2 The Model
We extend Sutton’s (1998) partial equilibrium model with vertically diﬀeren-
tiated goods and endogenous technical change by introducing spillovers into
the analysis. In the first period firms decide whether or not to enter at some
cost. In the second how much of the goods to supply to the market which
clears at some equilibrium price p∗. In the third period again supply deci-
sions are taken and the market is cleared. The strategic interdependence is
modelled á la Cournot. In each of the two market periods consumers behave
non-strategically.
Output decisions in the second period will influence the quality of the
product in the third. We analyze the model in a stage game framework
with each of the three periods corresponding to a stage. Firms are strategic
players and its total payoﬀs correspond to the sum of second and third stage
payoﬀs. The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The demand side of the model is as follows. The consumer’s utility func-
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tion is Cobb-Douglas of the form
U = (
X
j
ujxj)
δz1−δ (1)
where xj ∈ R+ is a ’quality good’ produced by firm j (with quality parameter
uj ∈ U with U = {u |u ∈ R+ and u ≥ 1}), and z ∈ R+ is an ’outside good’
or a composite commodity. Let all consumers have identical incomes.
Suppose that at the end of stage one N firms have entered (N ∈ N+)
which we will call ’active’. They are indexed by j = 1...N and are assumed
to produce one quality good in each of periods two and three. Given a price
vector p = (p1, ...pN)0, (pj) ∈ R+ and a quality vector u = (u1, ...uN)0 it is
well known that a consumer’s demand for the product of some firm k 6= j
takes the simple form
xk =
½
0 if
pk
uk
> min
j 6=k
pj
uj
Thus all quality goods with positive sales in equilibrium must have prices
proportional to their qualities
pj = λuj ∀ j = 1, ...i, ...N. (2)
10
How consumers individually allocate their budget over the quality goods
supplied by the firms is indeterminate but we can get a condition for the
aggregate of all consumers. Total expenditure on all quality goods of all
consumers equals a constant fraction δ, of total consumer income Y. We
denote this aggregate level of expenditure by δY ≡ S ∈ R+.
The proportionality factor λ can be found from the aggregate budget
constraint which also gives the condition for the vector of equilibrium market
prices. Total consumer expenditure on all varieties of the quality good must
equal total market size S so that
X
j
pjxj =
X
j
λujxj = S (3)
or
λ =
SP
j ujxj
(4)
Prices for good i are then given as
pi =
SP
j ujxj
ui (5)
using pj = λuj ∀ j again and profits for some firm i producing this good
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given common marginal costs c are
πi = (pi − c)xi =
Ã
SP
j ujxj
ui − c
!
xi (6)
Proposition 1 Under the previous assumptions, for any quality vector u =
(u1, ...uN)
0 the stage game in period three has a unique Nash equilibrium in
which it is firm i0s equilibrium strategy to produce output
x∗i =
S
c
N − 1
ui
PN
j=1
1
uj
(
1− N − 1
ui
PN
j=1
1
uj
)
(7)
which implies equilibrium prices of
p∗i =
cui
N − 1
NX
j=1
1
uj
(8)
and equilibrium net profits given a common marginal cost are
Sπ(ui |u−i ) = S
(
1− N − 1
ui
PN
j=1
1
uj
)2
(9)
Note that j = 1...i...N and u−i denotes a vector of quality of all other
firms of the form (u1, ...ui−1, ui+1, ...uN)0 with generic element (u−i). Note
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that as in the standard homogeneous good case the common cost component
c falls out in the calculation of equilibrium profits.
2.1 Learning and spillovers
We now introduce learning in this context. We assume that there are intra-
firm learning eﬀects but also inter-firm learning spillovers between the two
production stages so that perceived quality may depend on other firms’ out-
puts. The overall degree to which learning in one stage aﬀects future quality
is modeled by an elasticity parameter.
The quality level ui of firm i in stage three is parameterized as
ui = max(1,αxi + β0x−i)
1
γ ∀ i = 1...N (10)
where γ is an elasticity parameter giving the percentage change in quantity
necessary to achieve a unit change in quality, i.e. ’overall’ learning eﬀect with
γ → ∞ implying no learning. α is a scalar that determines the degree of
intra-firm learning with α ∈ [0, 1] and β0 is a the transpose of a (N − 1)× 1
column vector with generic elements (βi) ∈ [0, 1] that gives the degree of
inter-firm learning or spillovers for each firm.
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This parameterization allows us to consider the entire N×N dimensional
cube of learning eﬀects rather than only some convex combination of intra-
and inter-firm eﬀects. The quality level in stage two is assumed to be unity.
Given that in stage two firms are fully symmetric and we look for a
symmetric equilibrium of the subgame starting from stage two we know that
on the equilibrium path all firms will have the same quality level in stage three
too. Any one firm deviating will therefore take its rivals to have symmetric
qualities.
Equilibrium stage three net profits of a deviant firm, given all rival firms
have the same quality level (so that u−i has generic elements (u−i) = u¯)
depend only on relative quality which can be seen by rewriting (9) as
Sπ(ui |u−i ) = S


1−
N − 1
ui
h
(N − 1) 1
u¯
+ 1
ui
i



2
=
S
(
1− 11
N−1 +
ui
u¯
)2
(11)
If ui has generic elements (ui) = u¯ ∀ i we find that
Sπ(u¯i |u¯−i ) = Sπ(u¯) = S
N2
. (12)
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As stage three profits in equilibrium depend only on the relative quality
levels which in turn depend on the quantity choices in stage two via the learn-
ing technology we can calculate the optimal quantity choice as a subgame
perfect equilibrium for stage two of the model.
Proposition 2 Assuming full spillover symmetry (βi = β ∀ i) and N > 1,
the subgame for periods two and three with N active firms has a unique
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium involves period two
quantity choices of
x∗ =
S
Nc
(1− 1
N
) +
1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2c
(13)
Proof:
Total profits are given by the sum of stage two and stage three profits as
Πi = (p− c)xi + Sπ(ui |u−i ) (14)
which due to the technology (10) depends on stage two quantities only.
Quality symmetry u¯ = i in stage two implies that all products sell at
a common price which we find from (3) as p = S
i0x where column vector i
15
contains a column of 10s and x denotes the total quantity vector.
The optimal stage two quantity is derived from the first order condition
∂Πi
∂xi
−
·
S
i0x
− S
i0xx0i
xi − c
¸
= S
∂π
∂ui
∂ui
∂xi
+ S[∇π(u−i)]0∇u−i(xi) = 0 (15)
where the last term results from the fact that there will be spillovers from firm
i0s quantity decision in stage two on the other firms’ qualities in stage three.
These aﬀect firm i0s profits adversely. Hence there are strategic eﬀects that
firm i will take into account when deciding about output in stage two. The
assumption of output symmetry at this stage implies that on the equilibrium
path firms will also have symmetric qualities in stage three of the game, i.e.
(ui) = u¯ ∀ i.
The first element on the RHS of the first order condition is
∂π
∂ui
∂ui
∂xi
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = 2
(N − 1)2
N
× α
γ
1
α+ i0β
π
x
(16)
the second will be
[∇π(u−i)]0∇u−i(xi)
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = −2
(N − 1)2
N
× i
0β
γ(N − 1)
1
α+ i0β
π
x
(17)
16
derivations of both equations are relegated to the Appendix.
Inserting (16) and (17) and replacing π by (12) in (15) we find
∂Πi
∂xi
=
·
S
i0x
(1− xi
x0i
)− c
¸
+ 2
(N − 1)2
N
× α
γ
1
α+ i0β
S
N2x
−2(N − 1)
2
N
× i
0β
γ(N − 1)
1
α+ i0β
S
N2x
= 0 (18)
so that the own quantity eﬀect on the average quality of the opponents is
i0β
α(N−1) times the eﬀect on the own quality level. In case of full inter-firm
spillover symmetry (βi = β ∀ i) the first order condition simplifies to
∂Πi
∂xi
=
S
Nx
(1− 1
N
)− c+ 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2x
= 0 (19)
which we can solve for the optimal per firm production in stage two as
x∗ =
S
Nc
(1− 1
N
) +
1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2c
To satisfy the non-negativity constraint for output in case α < β we assume
that γ ≥ 2
N
so that γα<β ∈ [ 2N ,∞) and x∗ ∈ [0,
S
c
N+1
N2
]. As none of the
17
following results requires that γ → 0 the assumption does not constrain the
generality of the analysis. ¥
For the monopoly case N = 1 the subgame has no equilibrium as the
Cobb-Douglas utility function and its iso-elastic demand form imply that the
monopolist has profits of S−cxm so that for any quantity xm the monopolist
can increase profits by reducing xm where it obtains the same revenue at lower
cost. Hence there exists no subgame perfect equilibrium for this case. This
problem may be neglected because in our setting as we can always assume
that S is large enough to warrant entry of more than one firm.
We will thus focus on the case N > 1 in what follows.
Lemma 1 The following comparative statics results hold for N > 1
∂x∗
∂β
< 0,
∂x∗
∂α
> 0,
∂x∗
∂γ
|α>β < 0, ∂x
∗
∂γ
|β>α > 0
We thus find that larger inter-firm learning spillover and lower intra-firm
learning will reduce the subgame perfect equilibrium output in stage two.
The presence of spillovers introduce additional strategic considerations into
firms’ profit maximizing output decisions which can be seen in (15). The
more learning eﬀects can be used advantageously by the firm’s competitors
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relative to the benefits they imply for the firm itself, the more its incentives
to learn are distorted an hence the less it will decide to produce.
A larger overall learning elasticity parameter γ (lower learning possibil-
ities) given intra-firm learning dominates inter-firm learning spillovers will
decrease the subgame perfect equilibrium output in stage two. This follows
from the fact that given own learning is less eﬀective the firm will decide to
incur less costs (in the form of higher output) to benefit from it. The reverse
holds too: If inter-firm learning spillovers dominate individual learning and
overall learning becomes less eﬀective the firm will decide to produce more
output as its competitors will benefit less strongly from its own investment.
For identical learning parameter values (α = β) we find from (13) that the
equilibrium output being identical to Cournot quantities with homogeneous
goods. The same trivially holds for no overall learning eﬀects.
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Proposition 3 Equilibrium profits for firm i in the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the above Proposition are
Πi = 2
S
N2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
(20)
Proof:
Given (13) stage two profits are
(p− c)x∗ = ( S
i0x
− c)x∗ = S
N
− cx∗ =
S
N
−
·
S
N
(1− 1
N
) +
1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2
¸
=
S
N2
− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2
(21)
and total profits are (given each firm earns profits Sπ(u¯) = S
N2
in stage three)
Πi = 2
S
N2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
(22)
To satisfy the non-negativity constraint for total profit in case α > β we
assume that γ ≥ (N−1)
2
N
so that γα>β ∈ [
(N−1)2
N
,∞) and Πi ∈ [0, SN +
S
N2
]. ¥
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The last condition essentially implies that half the elasticity of perceived
quality on profits has to be smaller than the inverse learning elasticity γ, i.e.
the change in quantity required for a change in quality. Otherwise the ’cost’
of learning is too low relative to the profits form it so that firms produce
too much to make positive profits. Note that this condition implies that the
previous condition for non-negative quantities γα<β ≥ 2N always holds.
How do spillovers aﬀect total profits? From the fact that learning pos-
sibilities will induce firms to produce quantities in stage two that are above
the one shot profit maximizing level under Cournot assumptions to be able
to ’slide down’ learning curve, more overproduction will decrease total prof-
its further so that we find the opposite comparative statics eﬀects to the
previous Lemma 1 for N > 1:
∂Πi
∂β
> 0,
∂Πi
∂α
< 0,
∂Πi
∂γ
|α>β > 0, ∂Πi
∂γ
|β>α < 0.
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The derivatives of Lemma 1 imply
∂x∗
∂α¯¯¯
∂x∗
∂β
¯¯¯ = ¯¯∂Πi∂α ¯¯
∂Πi
∂β
=
β
α
i.e. the absolute value of a change of α has a proportional eﬀect on profits to
a change in β where the proportionality factor is given by the inverse ratio of
the two eﬀects. This form of symmetry holds independently of γ, c or N. This
implies that given intra-firm learning α is large relative to inter-firm learning
spillovers β a unit change (increase) in β will have a much larger (negative)
eﬀect on profits than a unit change (increase) in α. The independence of N
is interesting as this implies that this eﬀect is also independent of the total
size of the market.
For α = β (or γ → ∞) we find the Cournot level of profit without any
learning eﬀect for the two periods as ΠCi |α=β = 2 SN2 .
Looking at the corner solutions for total profits (20) we see that for α > β
the extreme case α = 1, β = 0 and any γα>β ∈ [
(N−1)2
N
,∞))
Πi |α=1,β=0 = 2 S
N2
(1− 1
γ
(N +
1
N
− 2)) < ΠCi ∀ γ.
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yields profits below the Cournot level. Assuming that γ reaches its lower sup-
port the firm will make total profits of zero producing x∗
¯¯¯
α=1,β=0,γ=
(N−1)2
N
=
S
c
N+1
N
from (13). Here firms may borrow and subsidize the learning process
in period two with its profits in period three. This may be interpreted as
a form of predatory pricing. If a no-borrowing constraint was imposed the
support would become γα>β ∈ [2
(N−1)2
N
,∞).
For β > α and any bounded γ one sees from (20) that profits will be
larger than under homogenous good Cournot assumptions. Optimal quan-
tities given the non-negativity constraint on quantities, γα<β ≥ 2N binds are
x∗
¯¯¯
α=0,β=1,γ= 2γ
= 0. Maximum profits are then given as
Πmaxi
¯¯¯
α=0,β=1,γ= 2
N
=
S
N
+
S
N2
This is intuitive as full spillovers will imply that (almost) nothing is produced
in period two. For reasons we have discussed before the profits will still be
the cartel profits, i.e. the monopoly profit S divided by the number of firms
N. Period three profit remains the same.
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2.2 The Equilibrium amount of entry
Following the process of backward induction we will finally determine entry
behaviour in stage one.
Proposition 4 Given entry costs of ε = 1 and for all α,β ∈ [0, 1] there
exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game where the
equilibrium number of active firms N∗ is given implicitly by the largest integer
number N that satisfies
2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
≥ N
2
S
(23)
Proof:
Entry will take place until the next firm will reduce profits below the sunk
entry cost of ε = 1.5 Hence the equilibrium number of firms is the largest
integer N that satisfies
2
S
N2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
≥ 1 (24)
5Note that having a sunk entry cost of ε (for example the initial cost to acquire a plant)
is innocous here even though we will be talking about a bound for the equilibrium number
of firms for the industry, since we will be looking at limit results and thus we can make ε
arbitrary small relative to total industry demand.
24
rearranging this equation yields the result. ¥
Lemma 2 The equilibrium number of firms N∗ has the following com-
parative statics
∂N∗
∂β
> 0,
∂N∗
∂α
< 0,
∂N∗
∂γ
|α>β > 0, ∂N
∗
∂γ
|β>α < 0.
The intuition is again straightforward and the eﬀects are symmetric to
those on profits: Larger inter-firm learning and lower intra-firm spillovers
lead to larger output and lower equilibrium profits and therefore lower entry
in stage one of the game. The eﬀect of the overall elasticity of learning
on the number of firms depends again on which eﬀect dominates. If own
firm learning is dominant, lower overall learning (higher γ) implies a lower
individual output and by backward induction a larger number of entrants
and vice versa.
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2.3 Finding a lower bound to concentration
Theorem 1 If α > β(γ + 1) a lower bound to concentration exists. If α ≤
β(γ + 1) the equilibrium number of firms N∗ goes out of bounds as the size
of the market S gets large, therefore a lower bound to market concentration
fails to exist.
This finding may seem surprising at first sight given the opposite but
symmetric eﬀect that α and β have on marginal profits. Requiring that intra-
firm learning eﬀects are simply stronger than inter-firm learning spillovers
(i.e. α > β) is not enough to guarantee a lower bound to concentration.
Looking at the optimal quantity choice (13) again and reminding ourselves
that for equally strong eﬀects (α = β) or for no overall learning γ → ∞ we
will find the one shot homogeneous good Cournot quantity as the optimal
output (for which no lower bound to concentration exists) we see that an
asymmetry of the two eﬀects is required for the existence of a bound.
For α < β a lower bound to concentration never exists (see Appendix).
Individual learning eﬀects are too weak relative to spillover eﬀects for any
degree of overall learning γ. Thus we require individual intra-firm learning to
be stronger in order to get an overproduction result in stage two that lowers
26
overall profits and bounds entry in stage one of the game. The asymmetry
thus has to be in favour of intra-firm learning eﬀects.
However simple dominance of the form α > β is only necessary, not
suﬃcient for the existence of a bound. Individual intra-firm learning has
to be supported by a strong overall learning eﬀect in order to be able to
induce the overproduction that limits entry and creates a lower bound to
concentration, i.e. satisfies the condition α > β(γ + 1).
Hence despite the apparently symmetric eﬀects of inter- and intra-firm
learning on profits the existence of a lower bound involves as an additional
requirement the degree of overall learning. It requires an asymmetry of the
former eﬀects in favour of inter-firm learning that needs to be larger the less
pronounced the degree of overall learning is.
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Solving the left hand side (LHS) of the equilibrium condition for N
2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
≥ 0 (25)
we define N˜(α,β, γ) as the largest integer that satisfies (25), i.e. gives an
upper bound on the equilibrium number of firms in the industry. This implies
a lower bound to market concentration in large markets. Even as the size of
the market becomes unbounded there will be no entry of additional firms into
the industry. Hence the n − firm concentration ratio Cn remains bounded
from zero.
Theorem 2 If N˜(α, β, γ) is well defined, then
∂N˜(α, β, γ)
∂β
> 0,
∂N˜(α, β, γ)
∂α
< 0,
∂N˜(α,β, γ)
∂γ
> 0. (26)
We therefore find that the upper bound to the equilibrium number of firms
in the industry N˜(α,β, γ) is decreasing in the level of intra-firm learning α
and increasing in the level of inter-firm spillovers β and the overall learning
elasticity parameter γ. The lower bound to concentration in large markets
will move in the opposite direction.
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Why is the upper bound on the equilibrium number of firms increasing in
the overall learning elasticity parameter γ, i.e. why is it unambiguously larger
for lower overall learning possibilities? This follows from noting that the
condition for the bound to exist, α > β(γ+1) implies that α > β always holds
for which the previous comparative statics show that equilibrium output in
stage two is decreasing and total profits are increasing. Hence the equilibrium
number of firms that enter in stage one and its upper bound (given it exists)
will increase too.
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2.3.1 Looking at the extreme spillover cases
Given that the number of firms N > 1 is now continuous and (23) holds with
equality. When there are no inter-firm learning spillovers (β = 0) we find the
derivative of LHS to be
∂(LHS)
∂N
|β=0 = −2
γ
µ
1− 1
N2
¶
< 0 (27)
for any γ unless γ → ∞. LHS will be a strictly decreasing function of
N and it is not converging to some positive number as α > β(γ + 1) is
always satisfied for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus it will cut the N − axis at some
N > 1 where we find an upper bound to the equilibrium number of firms
independent of market size. This is the same result as in Sutton (1998): Only
in the complete absence of overall learning eﬀects do we find no lower bound
to market concentration.
When there are complete inter-firm learning spillovers (β = 1) we find
∂(LHS)
∂N
|β=1 = 2 (1− α) N
2(1 + α)− 2N + 1− α
γ (α+N − 1)2N2
≥ 0 (28)
given N > 1 for any α ∈ [0, 1] and any γ. This implies that we do not
find a lower bound to concentration for any degree of intra-firm learning.
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α > β(γ + 1) = (γ + 1) always fails to hold.
Corollary 1 There exists a critical level of inter-firm learning β∗ such
that for β ≥ β∗ there is no lower bound to concentration.
This follows directly from Theorem 1 which implies that a lower bound
will not exist for β ≥ β∗ = 1
γ+1
α. This obviously does not imply that there
is no bounded equilibrium number of firms N∗ for a finite market size S.
Intuitively what happens is the following: For an increase in inter-firm
learning spillovers β relative to intra-firm learning α at a given elasticity γ
each firm will decreases its output level in stage two as spillovers which are
beneficial to its competitors start to outweigh its own learning eﬀects. The
increase in profits which follows from this output restriction will attract a
larger number of entrants in stage one. Given that β has risen above β∗,
equilibrium profit levels are such that for a growing market size an upper
bound on N fails to exist and as market grows strongly the equilibrium
number of entering firms N∗ goes out of bounds.
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3 Conclusion
As in Sutton’s (1998) model the upper bound on the equilibrium number
of firms increases in the overall learning elasticity parameter. However the
reasoning underlying the eﬀect is more complex. It follows from the fact
that the lower bound to concentration will only exist if intra-firm learning
dominates inter-firm spillovers and this asymmetry has to be stronger the
weaker the overall learning eﬀect.
If this asymmetry is suﬃciently pronounced, a higher elasticity, implying
lower overall learning eﬀects will unambiguously decrease individual quan-
tities, increase profits and lead to more firms entering at some sunk cost
hence pushing the lower bound to concentration downwards. Larger intra-
firm learning will lead to a decrease in the upper bound to the level of enter-
ing firms and hence move the lower bound to concentration upwards in large
markets. Inter-firm spillovers will work against this eﬀect.
Even if inter-firm spillovers are dominated by intra-firm learning eﬀects
an upper bound on the number of firms may not exist if the overall learning
elasticity parameter is large, i.e. if the overall learning eﬀect is too weak to
get suﬃcient overproduction which will limit equilibrium profits and entry.
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The equilibrium number of active firms grows unlimited as market size goes
out of bounds. Whence the n firm concentration ratio Cn will be negligible
and the lower bound to market concentration breaks.
In practice large inter-firm learning spillovers are often prevented by
patents and firm secrecy making the non-existence of the bound less likely.
However Theorem 1 still has an important policy implication. It suggests a
trade-oﬀ between inter-firm learning spillovers and overall learning. Given
an industry where we observe a high global concentration ratio and can be
certain that a lower bound holds due to very strong intra-firm and overall
learning eﬀects (e.g. memory microchips).
Here an exogeneous increase in the overall industry learning dynamics for
example by some new technology may allow for an increase in the level of
inter-firm spillovers (e.g. a relaxation of patent laws) without leading to a
change in market structure, i.e. without an eﬀect on entry or incumbents’
profits. Even as this industry grows very large (or if the new technology
reduces setup costs drastically) the trade-oﬀ guarantees that the conditions
for a bound still hold and its position is unchanged which will prevent a
fragmented market structure.
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Derivation of equilibrium prices (8) and Cournot-Nash profits (9) in a
diﬀerentiated product industry:
The profit of firm i with common marginal cost level c is given as
πi = λuixi − cxi (29)
Using the finding above that goods with positive sales in equilibrium must
have prices proportional to their qualities (2) we find λ from the total budget
condition as
λ =
S³P
j ujxj
´ j = 1, ...i, ...N.
The optimal quantity choice for firm i is found from its first order condi-
tion, i.e. by diﬀerentiating (29) with respect to quantity and setting it equal
to zero
∂πi
∂xi
= λui + uixi
∂λ
∂xi
− c = 0 (30)
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Diﬀerentiation of λ w.r.t. some xi yields
∂λ
∂xi
= − S³P
j ujxj
´2 ∂∂xi
ÃX
j
ujxj
!
= − Sui³P
j ujxj
´2 = −uiS λ2
Substituting for ∂λ
∂xi
and rearranging we find optimal quantities for firm i to
be
uixi =
S
λ
− cS
λ2
1
ui
(31)
and summation over all j firm’s products yields
X
j
ujxj =
NS
λ
− cS
λ2
X
j
1
uj
(32)
Using the total budget condition (3) again we can rewrite this as
S
λ
=
NS
λ
− cS
λ2
X
j
1
uj
(33)
and find
λ =
c
N − 1
X
j
1
uj
(34)
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Substitution for λ into (31) yields optimal qualities as
x∗i =
S
c
N − 1
ui
P
j
1
uj
(
1− N − 1
ui
P
j
1
uj
)
(35)
We now solve for equilibrium prices using pj = λuj ∀ j = 1, ...i, ...N so that
from (34) we find the price for good i as
p∗i =
cui
N − 1
X
j
1
uj
(36)
Alternatively we can write
p∗i − c =
(
ui
N − 1
X
j
1
uj
− 1
)
c (37)
Substituting (35) and (37) into the profit function (29) after some sim-
plification we find equilibrium profits of
π∗i =
(
1− N − 1
ui
PN
j=1
1
uj
)2
S
which is precisely π(ui |u−i ) as given in (9) if we ’normalize’ profits by defining
π(· |·) ≡ π∗i
S
. ¥
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Intermediate steps in the Proof of Proposition 2:
Derivation of (16) and (17). Taking the derivative of the stage three profit
function (11) with respect to ui, the quality level of firm i, given all other
firms have quality level u¯, i.e. (u−i) = u¯ yields
∂Sπ(ui |u−i )
∂ui
=
2Su¯ (ui(N − 1) + u¯(2−N)) (N − 1)2
(u¯+ ui(N − 1))3
(38)
Write (38) as an elasticity of perceived quality on profits given that all
firms have quality level u¯, i.e. (ui) = u¯ ∀ i of the form
ui
π
∂π
∂ui
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = 2
(N − 1)2
N
(39)
Note that symmetrically we find that from the Cournot profit function
(9)
uj
π
∂π
∂uj
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = −2
(N − 1)
N
(40)
so that firm j0s quality with j 6= i will have a negative eﬀect on firm i0s profit
π so that elasticity of perceived quality uj on profits πi is negative. For a
derivation see below.
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Derivation of (39) and (40), the elasticity of perceived rival quality on
firm i0s profits: From the Cournot profit function (9) (note that the sum over
j includes i) with N firms we find that the derivative of profits for firm i with
respect to its own quality level is
∂π
∂ui
= 2
Ã
1− N − 1
ui
P
j
1
uj
!Ã
1
u2i (
P
j
1
uj
)
Ã
N − 1− N − 1
ui
P
j
1
uj
!!
and the derivative of profits for firm i with respect to one other firm j0s
quality level is
∂π
∂uj
= −2
Ã
1− N − 1
ui
P
j
1
uj
!
 N − 1
ui
³P
j
1
uj
´2
u2j


Writing these in terms of elasticities we find the desired results.
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Rewriting first part of the right hand side (RHS) of the equation (15) as
∂π
∂ui
∂ui
∂xi
=
µ
ui
π
∂π
∂ui
¶
×
µ
π
ui
∂ui
∂xi
¶
(41)
using (39) and the elasticity formula for ui which gives the elasticity of per-
ceived quality in stage three with respect to stage two output as
xi
ui
∂ui
∂xi
=
α
γ
xi
(αxi + β0x−i)
(42)
we find
∂π
∂ui
∂ui
∂xi
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = 2
(N − 1)2
N
× α
γ
xi
(αxi + β0x−i)
π
xi
(43)
The continuity of the support of α and β guarantees that α = (βi) = 0 ∀
i is a zero probability event. We seek a symmetric SPNE in which firms set
a common output level x in stage two. We can therefore set xi = (x−i) = x
to simplify the above to
∂π
∂ui
∂ui
∂xi
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = 2
(N − 1)2
N
× α
γ
1
α+ i0β
π
x
(44)
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We make an assumption about full symmetry of spillovers as follows. The
complete learning technology can be written as
u = max(1, (Bx))
1
γ (45)
where B is a fully symmetric N × N matrix with generic elements (βij) =
(βji) = β ∀ i 6= j and (βij) = α ∀ i = j on the diagonal and u and x are
N × 1 column vectors of quality and quantity. This formulation can then be
broken into one of the form
u = max(1, (αx+Ξx))
1
γ (46)
where Ξ is now a N ×N matrix with (βij) = 0 ∀ i = j on the diagonal and
β everywhere else. This guarantees that we can write the symmetric quality
formula to (10) for some firm j as
uj = max(1, (αxj + ξ0jx))
1
γ (47)
where ξ0j is the j0th row of matrix Ξ of the generic form
(βj,1,βj,2, ...βj,j−1, 0,βj,j+1, ...βj,N).We now delete the empty diagonal by de-
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noting β0−j as the 1×N − 1 row vector without the j0th element and x−j as
the N − 1× 1 column vector of quantities without the j0th element so that
we can write
uj = max(1, (αxj + β0−jx−j))
1
γ (48)
as the symmetric counterpart to (10) for firm j. Note that vector x−j contains
element (xi).
Rewriting the second part of the RHS as
[∇π(u−i)]0∇u−i(xi) =
µ
1
π
[∇π(u−i)]0u−i
¶
×
µ
[∇u−i(xi)]0
1
u−i
π
¶
(49)
we find that the elasticity equation of quantity xi with respect to the qual-
ity of an average other firm (under spillover symmetry ’any’ other firm) −i
becomes
∇u−i(xi)
1
u0−i
xi =
i0β
γ(N − 1)
xi
(αxi + β0x−i)
(50)
so that using (40) for the aggregate of all (N − 1) other firm we find that
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[∇π(u−i)]0∇u−i(xi)
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = −2
(N − 1)2
N
× i
0β
γ(N − 1)
xi
(αxi + β0x−i)
π
xi
(51)
In a symmetric SPNE the above simplifies to
[∇π(u−i)]0∇u−i(xi)
¯¯
(ui)=u¯ = −2
(N − 1)2
N
× i
0β
γ(N − 1)
1
α+ i0β
π
x
(52)
¥
Proof of Lemma 1:
See that the optimal stage two quantity x∗ falls strictly in the level of
spillovers β for all N > 1 as
∂x∗
∂β
= −2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N
α
γ (α+ β(N − 1))2 c
< 0 (53)
and increases in the level of intra-firm learning α as
∂x∗
∂α
= 2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N
β
γ (α+ β(N − 1))2 c
> 0 (54)
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It also increases if the overall learning eﬀect becomes more important, as
∂x∗
∂γ
= −2
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸
S
N2
α− β
γ2 (α+ β(N − 1)) c < 0 (55)
given that α > β holds and has the opposite sign if α < β. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4 for a continuous number of firms:
The slope of LHS (25) which is now binding is
∂(LHS)
∂N
= −2 (α− β) (N − 1) N(α+ β) + α− β
γ (α+ β(N − 1))2N2
(56)
Thus LHS always attains an extreme point at N = 1 where it takes the value
2. Given N = 1+ε it follows from (23) that S > 1
2
so that the RHS takes the
value 1
S
< 2, i.e. below the LHS. For α > β the LHS is strictly decreasing and
will cut the strictly increasing parabola on the RHS at some finite equilibrium
value N∗ for any bounded value of S. Both functions are continuous so that
existence of N∗ follows from the intermediate value theorem and uniqueness
from the strictness property of both sides.
For α ≤ β andN > 1 the LHS is weakly increasing. The second derivative
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of the LHS is
∂2(LHS)
∂N2
= 4 (α− β) (N
3 − 3N)(αβ + β2) + 2β2 + 2αβ − α2
γ (α+ βN − β)3N3
(57)
Again existence follows from the continuity of the functions. To check
uniqueness for the case α ≤ β where both the LHS and the RHS slope
upwards we see from the above equation that the LHS is always weakly
concave i.e. ∂
2(LHS)
∂N2
≤ 0 for N > 1. As the RHS parabola is always strictly
convex this guarantees a unique intersection of the two curves and hence a
unique equilibrium number of firms. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
Although explicit calculation of N∗ is very involved the comparative stat-
ics follows from simple observation of LHS. ¥
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Proof of Theorem 1: An intercept with the N − axis (and thus an
upper bound on the equilibrium number of firms, N˜(α,β, γ)) will exist if the
LHS (25) converges to some negative number in the limit as N → ∞ (not
N∗). The limit result is
lim
N→∞
2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
= 2
β(γ + 1)− α
γβ
(58)
Hence for α ≤ β(γ + 1) the LHS will converge to some non-negative
number and no intercept exists, i.e. there will be no upper bound on N∗. For
for α > β(γ + 1) such an intercept exists. For this not to violate the non-
negativity constraint on total profits (quantities are always positive here) we
require that γα>β ≥
(N−1)2
N
.We can easily prove by example that γ < (N−1)
2
N
is not a necessary condition for α > β(γ + 1) in equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2:
The two roots that satisfy the binding LHS (25) for α > β(γ + 1) are
given by
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N˜1(α, β, γ) =
1
2
(α− β)(γ + 2)−√γ
p
((α− β) (γ(α− β) + 4α))
α− β(1 + γ) (59)
and
N˜2(α,β, γ) =
1
2
(α− β)(γ + 2) +√γ
p
((α− β) (γ(α− β) + 4α))
α− β(1 + γ) (60)
Note that both roots will always be positive as α > β(γ +1)⇒ α > β so
that the numerator and the denominator are always positive.
N˜1(α,β, γ) however does not satisfyN > 1 for β ∈ [0, 1] and α > β(γ+1).
Proof by contradiction:
N˜1(α, β, γ) > 1⇔
α− β −
√
γ
γ
p
((α− β) (γ(α− β) + 4α))| {z }
Ψ
> −2β (61)
For α = β(γ + 1) the above equation (61) holds with equality. We now
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show that Ψ is strictly decreasing in α. The derivative of Ψ w.r.t α is
∂Ψ
∂α
= 1− γ (α− β) + 4α+ (α− β) (γ + 4)
2
√
γ
p
((α− β) (γ (α− β) + 4α))
(62)
thus we need to show that
γ (α− β) + 4α+ (α− β) (γ + 4) > 2√γ
p
((α− β) (γ (α− β) + 4α))
or
α(γ + 4)− β(γ + 2)
γ
>
s
(α− β)2 + 4α(α+ β)
γ
Completion of the square yields
α(γ + 4)− β(γ + 2)
γ
+
2α
γ
>
sµ
(α− β) + 2α
γ
¶2
from which we find
2α− β > 0
This always holds as the condition α > β(γ + 1)⇒ α > β.
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Hence for some α0 > α = β(γ + 1) we find
α0 − β −
√
γ
γ
p
((α0 − β) (γ(α0 − β) + 4α)) < −2β (63)
which is a contradiction to (61). We conclude that 0 < N˜1(α,β, γ) < 1.
The comparative statics of the relevant root N˜2(α, β, γ) ≡ N˜(α,β, γ) can
be seen most easily by investigating the binding LHS (25)
2
½
1− 1
γ
α− β
α+ β(N − 1)
·
N +
1
N
− 2
¸¾
= 0
and noting that given N > 1
∂(LHS)
∂α
< 0,
∂(LHS)
∂β
> 0,
∂(LHS)
∂γ
|α>β > 0, ∂(LHS)
∂γ
|α<β < 0
As N˜(α,β, γ) denotes the intercept of LHS (25) with the N − axis given
α > β(γ+1) and LHS is monotonous and non-increasing for α ≥ β, we know
that N˜2(α,β, γ) will change accordingly. ¥
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